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Is Amendment of Section 96 Really Necessary?
Something must be done about section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867. 1 The 
Supreme Court of Canada’s interpretation of that section and its companions 
leaves the provinces with little flexibility in re-organizing their courts and 
developing new kinds of administrative agencies. The thesis of this note is that 
what needs to be done can be accomplished merely by some refinement of in­
terpretation by our new Supreme Court, which has shown remarkable open­
ness to a purposive approach to its work since it received a shot of intellectual 
adrenalin from section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.2
The court deserves full credit for recognizing the soundness of the pur­
posive interpretation of sections 96-100 put forward in 1956 by Professor 
Lederman in his classic article, “ The Independence of the Judiciary.” 3 The 
Lederman approach to the independence question consists of asking why those 
who drew up the 1867 constitution thought it desirable to entrench the in­
dependence of superior court judges, and then to look to constitutional 
history, institutional arrangements and principle for an answer. What the 
court has failed to do, however, is apply the refined approach of Lederman’s 
article to the question of which functions of superior courts are constitutional­
ly required to be performed exclusively by courts whose judges are secured in 
their independence by the law of the constitution. Instead, it has proceeded on 
the unstated assumption that all powers and functions vested in superior 
courts as of 1867 are to be reserved to those courts because of their entrenched 
independence.
If we say that superior court functions are largely frozen in terms of the 
particulars of 1867, we indiscriminately deny provinces flexibility with respect 
to both the central constitutional functions of superior courts (a necessary 
denial) and the various other functions which resided in superior courts in 1867 
merely by reason of the circumstances of the day (an unnecessary denial, I will 
argue). A pair of illustrations will help. Judicial review of the exercise of
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statutory powers is the method our constitution uses to ensure government ac­
cording to law. That function is our way of maintaining the rule of law, a fun­
damental constitutional value, and it follows that it must be performed by 
judges whose independence is as far as practicable insulated from political in­
terference. On the other hand, there are many functions — such as deciding 
civil claims going beyond a small claims amount or the granting of divorces 
and child custody — which were regarded as superior court matters in 1867 
simply because the young colonies either lacked the resources or saw no need 
to establish other professional courts to share some of these ordinary burdens.
The Supreme Court’s historically restricted interpretation of sections 
96-100 fails to take into account the transformation of institutions that has oc­
curred since 1867. The last two decades have seen provincial courts progress 
from unsophisticated institutions staffed by lay magistrates, police pro­
secutors and untrained staff to professionalized courts whose judges in many 
instances provide a higher quality of administration of justice than superior 
court judges by reason of specialization, careful selection for suitability to par­
ticular functions (especially important in family courts) and more attention to 
appropriateness of setting and supply of support staff. The provinces have 
made an effort in recent years to find the flexibility they need if institutions are 
to be adapted to changing needs and circumstances. One effort in this direc­
tion was the proposed constitutional amendment that would have given pro­
vinces power to appoint judges and board members to adjudicate any matter 
coming within section 92.4 In my view that approach is fundamentally 
misconceived. It treats the problem as one pertaining to the federal division of 
powers rather than recognizing that the primary value to be secured is not 
federalism but the rule of law, which only an independent judiciary can assure.
The power to lead us out of the impasse lies with the Supreme Court. 
What the court should do is identify those superior court functions whose per­
formance by constitutionally secured judges is necessary to preserve fun­
damental constitutional values. This inquiry is easier today than it would have 
been in 1867, for two reasons. First, we have a clearer understanding, since 
1982, of the role of courts in the constitutional process. Judicial review under 
the Charter and the rest of the constitution is expressly required by section 52 
of the 1982 Act. Judicial review of the exercise of statutory powers is essential 
to maintaining a structure of government that makes possible effective limits 
on powers. Trial of some of the more serious offences is, according to the 
McEvoy case, reserved to superior court judges, although the Supreme Court 
gave little in the way of particulars nor any rationale for this reservation of 
function.5 Secondly, the inquiry need no longer be cluttered with concerns
4The proposed amendment, which is set out in a discussion paper entitled “ The Constitution of Canada — A 
Suggested Amendment Relating to Provincial Administrative Tribunals” issued in 1983 by the Minister of Justice 
of Canada, is as follows:
96B(1) Notwithstanding section 96, the Legislature of each province may confer on any tribunal, board, 
commission or authority other than a court, established pursuant to the laws of the Province, concurrent or ex­
clusive jurisdiction in respect of any matter within the legislative authority of the province.
(2) Any decision of a tribunal, board, commission or authority on which any jurisdiction of a superior 
court is conferred under subsection (1) is subject to review by a superior court o f the Province for want or excess 
of jurisdiction.
1McEvoy v. A.-G. New Brunswick (1983), [1983J 1 S.C.R. 704.
about the absence of other competent courts. The absence of other competent 
courts is not a constitutional reason for vesting certain functions in superior 
courts. That is just a circumstance of the evolution of a system of courts. Yet 
by using the 1867 situation as a benchmark we have elevated circumstance into 
constitutional principle. Provinces should be free to allocate judicial functions 
in response to a rational assessment of where they can be performed most ef­
fectively, subject only to such limits on flexibility as can be demonstrably 
justified by reference to the constitution.
Some flexibility is apparent in the leading case interpreting section 96. In 
John East Iron Works the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council gave a 
general green light to provincial establishment and appointment of new kinds 
of administrative tribunals such as labour relations boards, as long as they 
were not attempts to supplant superior courts in some of their functions and as 
long as they are subject to ultimate superior court review on jurisdictional 
grounds.6 Similarly, in A.-G. Quebec v. A.-G. Canada the Supreme Court 
recognized that the respective jurisdictions of superior courts and other courts 
cannot be frozen in their 1867 state.7 Changing circumstances such as changes 
in the value of money require some flexibility in re-allocating jurisdictions. 
However, our tendency to shun leading cases and principles as the basis of 
constitutional interpretation in favour of the encyclopedic marshalling of all 
conceivably relevant authorities has resulted in a failure to use the existing 
flexibility effectively for constitutional evolution. Hence the perceived con­
stitutional impasse, accompanied by provincial demands for constitutional 
amendment to break it.
Such a conclusion is misguided. Consider, for instance, the implications 
of Lord Simonds’ opinion in John East Iron Works:
It is legitim ate to  ask  w hether, if  trade  unions had  in 1867 been recognized by law , if  
collective bargain ing had  then  been the accepted postu la te  o f  industria l peace, if, in 
a  w ord , the econom ic and  social ou tlook  had  been the  sam e in 1867 as it becam e in 
1944, it w ould no t have been expedient to  establish ju st such a  specialized tribuna l as 
is provided by sec. 4 o f  the A c t.'
Lord Simonds’ concern was whether decisions committed to the board should 
be made by judges rather than administrators, not whether it would require 
superior court judges or could be entrusted to other judges if judicial power 
were called for. Hence the view has developed that the case is not authority for 
flexibility in the allocation of functions as between superior court judges and 
provincially appointed judges. If, however, we recognize as the underlying 
concern of sections 96-100 that superior court judges, constitutionally secured 
from political interference, should have the exclusive exercise of those judicial 
powers necessary to preserve the constitution, we can then contemplate 
answering the following question by applying the principles of the John East 
case:
6Labour Relations Board o f Saskatchewan v. John East Iron Works Ltd. (1948), [1949] A.C. 134.
7(1965), [1965] S.C.R. 772.
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If  the  fam ily h ad  in 1867 been recognized as an  im p o rtan t, discrete subject in the ad ­
m in istration  o f  justice , i f  the in tegrated  provision  o f  jud icial and  non-judic ia l ser­
vices an d  fo rm s o f  relief h ad  been the accepted postu la te  o f  effective fam ily law  ad ­
m in istration , and  if  there  h ad  existed the  kinds o f  com peten t, professional inferior 
court judges w ho are  fou n d  in the p rovincial fam ily courts to d ay , w ould it have been 
expedient to  establish in ferio r courts to  exercise com prehensive ju risd ic tion  in fam i­
ly law m atters?
But we do not even ask that question because of the indiscriminate approach 
that has led us to view all functions exercised by superior courts in 1867 as hav­
ing a rational constitutional basis for exclusive reservation to those courts.
If we are to regain the flexibility needed to respond to normal evolution of 
institutions we must begin by asking more refined questions about what sec­
tions 96-100 are meant to protect. The historical approach does not, by itself, 
provide an answer. It provides only evidence of past practice, leaving us with 
the further question of how much of past practice was a response to constitu­
tional principle as opposed to circumstance. There is no doubt that superior 
courts are central to our constutional system and house the core of judicial 
power that secures the rule of law and preserves the constitution itself. There is 
also no doubt that judicial review under the constitution, judicial review of the 
exercise of statutory powers, and a core of criminal and civil jurisdiction are 
permanently and exclusively committed to those courts. But it is an ex­
travagant claim to assert that citizens have a constitutional right of access to 
superior courts on all matters which fell within their jurisdiction in 1867, when 
those courts did everything thought to require legal competence and experience 
because there were no alternatives. For the most part, inferior courts were staf­
fed by people with little or no legal training, and this remained the dominant 
fact into the 1970s. Only in the last decade and a half have we found the 
necessary people and resources to develop fully professional benches in the 
courts of inferior jurisdiction. If inferior courts of today’s calibre had been 
developed by 1867, I suggest that many more matters would have been com­
mitted to those courts than were in fact, and we would have been blessed with 
a better understanding of what matters belong in the exclusive core jurisdiction 
of superior courts.
Perhaps, therefore, the first question the John East case should lead us to 
ask is:
I f  there  h ad  existed in the  colonies in 1867 the calibre o f  in ferio r courts th a t exist to ­
day, w ould it have been expedient to  confer w ider ju risd ic tion  generally on  those 
courts, w hich were located  th ro u g h o u t the  colonies, leaving only  certain  key judicial 
functions to  the inaccessible and  expensive superio r cou rts, w hich were centralized, 
usually in the  capital city o f  each colony?
If an affirmative answer seems likely to this question, then we owe it to those 
provinces which have developed credible inferior court systems to call on the 
Supreme Court to indicate the key judicial functions that only superior courts 
may perform. In so doing, the court would give provinces a clear indication of 
the scope of their flexibility in court re-organization and put a merciful end to 
the movement for a constitutional amendment that may ultimately do more 
harm than good by substituting expedience for principle in the judicature pro­
visions of the constitution.
The related question of what matters must, as a constitutional require­
ment, be committed to judicial power should be easier to answer once we have 
identified the key judicial functions that belong exclusively to those centraliz­
ed, senior courts that form the core of the judicature and whose judges enjoy 
an entrenched independence. When we know what judicial functions require 
the special protection of entrenchment we will no longer see a threat to the 
constitution in every arrangement that seems to transfer authority from judges 
to administrators. Both history and theory point to a system of government 
with limited powers exercised in accordance with law. It follows that both 
judicial review under the constitution and judicial review of the exercise of 
statutory powers are among the constitutional functions of superior courts. 
Otherwise both the limits on powers and the requirement to observe the law 
become meaningless; governments could ignore them with impunity. The 
Supreme Court has clearly and specifically decided that this is so in the B.C. 
Power case and the Crevier case respectively.9 Beyond that, the only specifica­
tion of entrenched functions came in the McEvoy case in which the court add­
ed serious criminal cases to the list. There are two inferences that can be drawn 
from McEvoy. One is that citizens have a right of access to superior courts on 
all serious matters. The other is that superior courts, with their highly-skilled 
pools of legal experience, have a general supervisory function in the judicial 
system and must therefore retain the top slice of the criminal and civil jurisdic­
tion sufficient to enable them to set the tone and maintain the standards for 
the entire judicial system. I suggest that the second hypothesis is the better one. 
Seriousness has been historically defined largely in terms of the amount of 
money involved, and the proposition becomes in reality one entitling those 
with the most money to not only the most expensive lawyers but also the most 
expensive judges. If the first hypothesis were sound, we would never have con­
ferred on judges on inferior courts extensive powers to deprive citizens of their 
liberty.
The time has come to separate entrenched principle from entrenched 
privilege by defining the entrenched jurisdiction of superior courts, beyond 
judicial review, in terms of the minimum quality of administration of justice 
required by the constitution. In the administration of criminal justice this is 
not a difficult task. The McEvoy case has already performed it in a general 
way. If there is access to superior courts for trial of the most serious criminal 
offences those courts will control the shaping and development of criminal law 
and procedure. Whether there is a corresponding core of superior court 
jurisdiction in the sphere of civil justice is less clear. Civil justice includes many 
fields of law as well as the distinct systems of civil law, common law and equi­
ty. The problem is lessened, however, by the fact that appeals to superior 
courts lie from inferior court decisions in all matters. This was not the case in 
1867, when general access to courts of appeal staffed by separate, appellate 
judges was not the rule as it is today, and it is a very important consideration. 
It means that, at least since Crevier, there is a right of access to superior courts 
either by way of appeal or judicial review in respect of virtually every decision
9British Columbia Power Corporation v. British Columbia Electric Company (1962), [1962] S.C.R. 642; Crevier 
v. A.-G. Quebec (1981), [1981] 2 S.C.R. 220.
that affects citizens directly, whether the decision-maker is an inferior court 
judge or an administrator.
In minimizing the inflexibility imposed by sections 96-100 to the minimum 
necessary to secure the fundamental values those provisions are meant to 
secure, we end up with four categories of function which ought to belong ex­
clusively to superior courts and which cannot be transferred to inferior courts 
or to administrative tribunals. And if those values are to be secured, it cannot 
matter whether appointments to those inferior courts and administrative 
tribunals are made by the central or provincial governments. As Professor 
Lederman has argued convincingly, it is not the power of appointment which 
sections 96-100 are meant to secure but the independence of the judiciary.
The four categories of function reserved by the constitution to superior 
courts are: (1) judicial review of legislative and executive action under the con­
stitution; (2) judicial review of the exercise of statutory powers; (3) a core of 
the administration of criminal justice; (4) a core of the administration of civil 
justice. The first two categories require little elaboration. They are well- 
defined, discrete areas of law. The other two are more difficult to pin down. 
If, however, we begin by asking why superior courts must exercise a core 
jurisdiction in both criminal and civil justice, we proceed through matters of 
independence, impartiality, competence and concentration of time and 
resources to reach the underlying value of the rule of law. Our constitution 
seeks to secure those minimum institutional arrangements necessary to ensure 
that ours is a society under law; that is, a society in which adjudication is the 
required method of resolving differences which cannot be worked out through 
discussion, negotiation, compromise and agreement. Coercion and other 
forms of self-help are incompatible with our conception of a free and 
democratic society. If this is our concern, then what matters for constitutional 
purposes is maintaining the quality in the law and in legal institutions 
necessary to preserve public respect for and confidence in the courts. Today, 
perhaps unlike 1867, there is a regular system of appeals to superior courts of 
the highest quality, and also in virtually every province a regionalized provin­
cial court system of so-called inferior courts that is staffed by competent pro­
fessionals. The inflexible view of entrenched superior court jurisdiction is 
simply inappropriate today.
The idea of a core jurisdiction in criminal and civil justice entrenched in 
the superior courts is admittedly vague, but it can be tested against some con­
temporary issues of court reform. One essential characteristic of criminal 
justice is that citizens do not come to the criminal courts out of choice. It is not 
surprising, then, that we have been willing since Confederation to confer ex­
tensive criminal jurisdiction on inferior courts even though the stakes are 
highest there. Our liberty is at risk in criminal prosecutions, and in 1867 one’s 
life was also at risk in capital cases. Yet we conferred power on untrained 
judges in order to protect superior courts from being swamped by a volume of 
cases that would have denied them the conditions needed to perform a central, 
supervisory role. But we have always reserved the most serious criminal mat­
ters to superior courts, and in McEvoy the Supreme Court has decided that the 
constitution requires such a reservation.
The skewing of constitutional principal is particularly conspicuous in 
family law administration where the division of jurisdiction between superior 
and inferior courts has really reflected the wealth of litigants. For the wealthy, 
with property to fight over and with the means to retain lawyers for divorce 
and custody proceedings, superior courts have been the forum. For those 
without wealth the same human problems have been defined legally in terms of 
maintenance and child welfare and committed to provincial (inferior) courts. 
It is not wholly irrelevant that, when the Supreme Court decided in the Adop­
tion Act reference that a variety of family law statutes dealing with these mat­
ters could be committed to judges appointed by the provinces (non-section 96 
judges) it relied in part on an analogy between those statutes and the poor laws 
which, in England, were administered in the inferior courts.10 No constitu­
tional principal requires us to maintain a division of jurisdiction that depends 
ultimately on the economic status of litigants. That division reflects political 
priorities rather than constitutional principle and we have inadvertently, 
through a rather mechanical interpretation of sections 96-100, erected political 
priorities of 1867 into constitutional bars to legislative response to the changed 
priorities of today. Those new priorities find expression in the movement to 
establish unified family courts, a movement which since 1970 at least has been 
frustrated by an insistence that only superior court judges can exercise jurisdic­
tion in relation to divorce, matrimonial property and child custody.
It is, however, simply irrational to claim that the constitution prohibits 
the allocation of these elements of family law administration to competent, 
professional judges who specialize in family law administration, who are 
selected for their suitability for that kind of judicial work, who are readily 
available in every part of the province (unlike the centralized superior court 
judges) and who function in a special court facility that is designed and located 
in response to the special needs and problems of family law administration and 
is served by a wide range of non-judicial family services. Yet for nearly two 
decades we have been deterred by that claim, based as it apparently is on the 
highest authority, from proceeding with the development of the unified family 
court system that virtually everyone seems now to agree is needed for the pro­
per administration of family law.
As long as the Supreme Court treats all superior court functions in­
discriminately we will be denied the full benefit of the excellent provincial 
court systems that all provinces have built over the past two decades. If, 
however, that court is willing to refine its interpretation of the functions en­
trenched in superior courts by sections 96-100 then the provinces will enjoy the 
benefit of needed flexibility in making rational re-allocations of jurisdiction on 
the basis of priorities and resources in the important provincial domain of the 
administration of justice. The alternative is constitutional amendment, which 
is difficult to secure and which may be less desirable because it lacks the flex­
ibility of judicial interpretation as a method of securing the minimum condi­
tions to preserve the rule of law. Judging by the one proposed amendment put 
forward by the provinces to date, there is a danger that lack of awareness of
10Reference re Authority to Perform Functions Vested by the Adoption Act, the Children‘s Protection Act, the 
Children o f Unmarried Parents Act, the Deserted Wives’ and Children’s Maintenance Act of Ontario (1938), 
[1938] S.C.R. 398 at 403, 419.
what is at stake could produce a change that substitutes expedience for princi­
ple, and which would force the Supreme Court judges to engage in some form 
of intellectual gymnastics in order to secure the constitutional value which 
must be secured at all costs. That value is, of course, the rule of law.
We rightly look to history for help in the interpretation of constitutional 
provisions. But we may forget that not all of that history reflects deliberate 
and purposeful choices. Much of the historical context of 1867 was merely a 
reflection of happenstance, and bears no constitutional significance. I have 
suggested that the powers and jurisdiction of superior courts at the time of 
Confederation were the product of both design and accident. The unfinished 
business of the Supreme Court of Canada in the interpretation of section 96 is 
to identify those superior court functions so essential to our system of govern­
ment that they must be reserved exclusively to judges whose independence is 
constitutionally secured. Once that is done, the provinces will be free to re­
organize their court systems and allocate jurisdictions in response to rational, 
functional considerations. Amendment of section 96 is not necessary.
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